Electronic voting machines, supplied primarily by one or two companies with ties to the Republican Party, have been suspected of being vulnerable to vote-flipping
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- Could the 2016 Election Be Stolen with Help from Electronic Voting Machines?
Could the 2016 Election Be Stolen with Help from Electronic Voting Machines? Democracy Now, February 23, 2016
- Durham begins state-ordered recount of Nov. 8 ballots
Zachery Eanes, Herald-Sun, Dec 3, 2016 At an emergency meeting on Friday — when the Durham BOE had officially requested an extension of its deadline — the election board also requested the use of 26 voting machines, rather than the normal 16, to recount the votes. That would’ve meant the BOE needed to hire 52 workers — two for each machine, split 50-50 between registered Republicans and Democrats — at a cost of around $35,000 to $40,000 to the county. But the BOE was only permitted to use 16 machines, of which only 12 were being operated during the Saturday recount. Officials said that was because they did not get enough workers to volunteer for the counting, with roughly 26 workers participating.
- Greg Palast - The No-BS Inside Guide to the Presidential Recount
Sorry, no Russian hacker hunt, by Greg Palast for Truthout, 11/30/2016 More likely it's "spoiled ballots", provisional ballots, absentee ballots, discouraged voters, and Crosscheck.
- True Democracy Party - Voting Machines
Voting Machines True Democracy Party, March 26, 2016 Massive and Potential documented voting machine FRAUD has led the True Democracy Party to one Conclusion. You can not trust voting machines, period. There are 2 Main Voting Machine Companies: Diebold and ES&S. They are both owned by two men who are brothers and staunch Republicans. They both have refused to tell anyone how votes are tabulated/counted. And there is an overwhelming mountain of evidence of fraud and manipulation of these machines.
- UPDATE: Voting Machines Reported Flipping in Early Elections
UPDATE: Voting Machines Reported Flipping in Early Elections October 31, 2014 by Marianne Moonhouse and Barbara With Wisconsin Citizens Media Cooperative
- Vote counting and voting machines - multiple links
- Voting system failures: A database solution
Lawrence Norden, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2010, https://www.brennancenter.org/
- VSTAAB-Security-Analysis-of-Diebold-AccuBasic-Interpreter-2006.pdf
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter. David Wagner, David Jefferson, Matt Bishop, for the Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board (VSTAAB), with the assistance of Chris Karlof and Naveen Sastry, February 14, 2006. Review of source code. Conclusions: We have detailed a number of security vulnerabilities in the AV-OS and AV-TSx implementations of the AccuBasic interpreter. In the long term, these vulnerabilities can be easily fixed and the risks eliminated or mitigated. We have made recommendations about several ways in which that might be accomplished. In the short term, we believe the risks can be mitigated through appropriate use procedures.