The exam will consist of ten questions, selected from those listed here, although some specific details might change. Additional unpublished questions may be included.
You will have two hours for the exam.
You may not use books, notes, or other sources during the exam itself. Bring an official examination book (blue book) to write your answers.
- Describe two examples of apparent rule use in language. For each example, describe the different way in which physical symbol systems and connectionist models would explain this behavior.
- Why does research on the development of language in children provide such a rich data base for comparing physical symbol systems and connectionist models?
- In addition to language development, what other topics in developmental psychology have provided opportunities for comparing physical symbol systems and connectionist models?
- How would a connectionist respond to Fodor's argument based on language learning for the existence of a "Language of Thought"?
- Outline as best you can the argument made by physical symbol theorists that connectionist theories are incomplete or inadequate for explaining behavior.
- Outline as best you can the argument made by connectionist theorists that physical symbol theories are unnecessarily complex.
- Explain how Marr's notion of "levels of theory" might serve to reconcile conflicts between physical symbol systems and connectionist theories.
- Describe the difference between Fodor's concept of a modular process and Cosmides and Tooby's concept of a modular process.
- Outline Cosmides and Tooby's argument that evolution necessarily produces modular, not domain-general cognitive processes.
- Is the Cosmides and Tooby modularity hypothesis more consistent with a mental architecture built on a physical symbol system, a connectionist mental architecture, or neither? Explain why?
- Why does Fodor believe that domain-general central processing is a necessary component of mental architecture?
- Why does Fodor believe that it is not possible to provide a complete explanation of domain-general central processing?
- Explain the difference between declarative and procedural knowledge. How does ACT represent each form of knowledge?
- The R in ACT-R stands for "rational". In what way is the ACT-R system rational?
- One of the buffers used in ACT-R is a goal buffer. How is the goal buffer used, and why is it so important in modeling behavior?
- Explain how ACT manages to combine the principles of physical symbol systems and the principles of connectionist models.
- Describe the difficulties that are faced by Leslie's theory of pretend play in children.
- How does Leslie respond to criticisms of his theory of pretend play? How has his response itself been criticized?
- In what way has the study of autistic children contributed to an understanding of normal children's mental development?
- In Baron-Cohen's theory of development, how are empathy and theory of mind related? How do they differ?
- Should the components of Baron-Cohen's theory be considered modular in the sense used by Cosmides and Tooby? Why, or why not?
- How do simulationist theories differ from other theoretical explanations for the development of mindreading?
- How might a connectionist model explain the acquisition of a "theory of mind", as reflected in answers to the Sally-Anne problem.
- Simulationist theories propose that mindreading abilities depend on other systems being co-opted during evolution. Explain what this means, and suggest other ways in which the evolution of human abilities might co-opt other systems.
- Is Baron-Cohen's theory more consistent with a mental architecture built on a physical symbol system, a connectionist mental architecture, or neither? Explain why?
- Give an example of how one might test evolutionary psychology theories by studying individual difference variables.
- In discussions of rationality, the definition of "rational" relies heavily on the notion of coherence, or consistency. What does this mean? Why is it important for defining rational behavior?
- A common error found in studies of reasoning is ignoring base rates (e.g., the proportion of women who have breast cancer when interpreting a positive screening for breast cancer). How does the notion of System 1 reasoning explain this error?
- The conjunction fallacy, as exhibited in the Linda problem, is a common error in studies of reasoning. How does the notion of System 1 reasoning explain this error?
- How do dual process theories explain the difference between deontic and non-deontic versions of the Wason four card problem?
- The System 2 reasoning process is described as being context free. What is the major difficulty with this proposal from the perspective of other theories in cognitive science? How might this difficulty be overcome by dual process theorists?
- What correlational evidence (in which two or more variables are measured but none is manipulated) supports dual process theories of reasoning?
- What experimental evidence (in which at least one variable is manipulated) supports dual process theories of reasoning?
- Explain why the High-Low game demonstrates the inadequacy of standard game theory formulations of rational choice in social dilemmas. [In the High-Low game, both players win, say $10 if they both choose H, they win, say, $5 if they both choose L, and they win nothing if their choices are different]
- How do Nowak et al explain the evolution of "fairness" in situations like the ultimatum game, given that pure self interest might be an evolutionarily dominant strategy.
- Explain how Gintis's theory of a "choreographer" might be similar to theories of moral reasoning outlined by Krebs. Is it different in any way?
- Use theories of moral reasoning, how would you explain the findings by Jensen et al that chimpanzees neither exhibit fairness, nor punish others for being unfair, in the ultimatum game.
- How would you reconcile the idea that System 2 reasoning is necessary to solve reasoning problems involving logic and probability, but may not be useful for solving social dilemmas?
- Most cognitive scientists try to avoid theoretical statements about consciousness that might imply dualist assumptions. What is dualism and why is it avoided?
- One assumed difference between System 1 and System 2 reasoning processes is that with System 2 we are consciously aware of the deliberation, while System 1 answers seem to arise automatically. Why might the systems have evolved to be different in this way?
- Dual process theories of reasoning were developed originally to explain performance in tasks such as logical reasoning, but some authors have claimed that they apply also to moral reasoning. What problems arise when trying to test dual process theories in the moral reasoning sphere? What might be learned about dual processes by studying moral reasoning that cannot be learned from studies of logical reasoning.
- Haidt and others claim that moral judgments arise from intuitive emotional responses to certain scenarios. Why is this hypothesis supported by findings that a person's sensitivity to body sensations is an important moderator variable in studies of moral judgment.
- Using the classification of theoretical approaches proposed by Marr and
by Stanovich, how would you categorize the following. Give an explanation
for each answer. Feel free to assign a topic to more than one category,
or to divide it among categories.
a. Connectionist network theories
b. Physical symbol system models
c. Production system models of problem solving (e.g., ACT-R)
d. Models of memory based on propositionalrepresentations of knowledge
e. The two systems of reasoning postulated in dual process theories
f. Gintis's "choreographer" theory of behavior in social dilemmas
g. Haidt's intuitionist theory of moral reasoning.
h. Dennett's "fame" theory of consciousness